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Abstract. In contrast to the first Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory which was mostly 
about preventing currency areas’ exposure to asymmetric shocks, the second model 
introduced by Robert A. Mundell (1973) focuses on risk sharing across member states when 
facing adverse macroeconomic shocks. This paper explores how risk is shared across the six 
member states of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Using 
dynamic panel VAR, we measure disposable income and consumption smoothing of 
negative output shocks. We find that more than 72 percent of GDP idiosyncratic shocks 
remain unsmoothed in the case of the Central African currency area from 1986 to 2018. 
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1. Introduction 
he possible devaluation of the CFA Franc was discussed during 
several summits held in Yaoundé (2016 and 2019) and N’djamena 
(2018) involving the international Monetary Fund (IMF) and CEMAC 
countries thus raising questions about the optimality of the CFA franc zone 
as a currency area. The debate intensifies in the face of local authorities’ 
determination to defend the CFA franc’s peg to the euro, thus refusing 
devaluation and choosing to comply with the IMF’S structural adjustment 
program (SAP) instead. 
The CFA Franc zone consists of two currency unions: the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) comprised of six 
member states (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) on one hand, and the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) formed by eight member states 
(Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo) on the other hand. Two central banks, namely the Bank of the 
Central African States (BEAC) and the Central Bank of the West African 
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States (BCEAO), issue two separate currencies both named CFA Franc and 
pegged to the euro since the existing monetary cooperation agreements 
between the member states and France1. The CFA franc rate has evolved 
through time2. 
This loss of the CFA franc purchasing power throughout the years has 
led economists such as M’Bet and Niamkey to express their skepticism on 
the common currency’s ability to shelter member states from adverse 
macroeconomic shocks. This echoes Baldwin & Wyplosz (2004) who stress 
that the loss of economic monetary policy sovereignty becomes most 
significant for members of a currency union if poorly integrated member 
states face asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. Indeed, forming a currency 
union carries benefits and costs. However, in order for it to be considered 
optimal, the economic gain obtained by the increase of interregional trade 
must outweigh the cost of losing control over national monetary policy. 
The OCA theory holds that an entire area should adopt a fixed exchange 
rate administration between currencies or a single currency within its 
geographic boundaries in order to benefit from the reduction of exchange 
rate uncertainty. For this reason, a country that considers membership in a 
currency union has to balance the economic stability loss against the 
monetary efficiency of a single currency. 
In this paper, we explore Mundell’s (1973) hypothesis that a common 
currency area offers insurance for its members against country-specific 
shocks in the context of OCA with international risk sharing. By analyzing 
and quantifying risk-sharing across CEMAC countries, we can assess the 
optimality of the CEMAC as a currency union, regarding this theory. In so 
doing, we use the Asdrubali et al. output variance decomposition both in a 
static and dynamic context, using a panel VAR. We also discuss about the 
evolution of risk sharing overtime as well as the substitutability of 
smoothing channels. Then we compare our results with the existing 
literature, in particular Yehoue’s (2005) results concerning risk sharing 
within the CEMAC, as well as Asdrubali and Kim’s results on risk sharing 
in Europe and in the US. 
Following the present introduction in Section 1, Section 2 includes an 
overview of international risk sharing in currency unions, including the 
CFA Franc zone, in the economic literature and reviews different 
approaches used by scholars in order to quantify the amount of shock 
smoothed through identified channels. Section 3 describes the 
methodology and estimation techniques we apply in this study. Then we 
proceed on presenting dataset sources, empirical results, as well as policy 
implications in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we provide concluding 
remarks and offer some suggestions for future research concerning the 
CEMAC as a currency union. 
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2. International risk-sharing and currency unions in the 
economic literature 
Research related to international risk sharing mostly concern 
industrialized advanced economies such as the United States and European 
countries. Inspired by Mundell‘s (1973) OCA theory on international risk-
sharing suggesting that asymmetric shocks cannot threaten a currency area 
if risk-sharing mechanisms are efficient in facilitating adjustments, a fairly 
substantial literature focus on measuring the amount of international risk 
sharing happening across a set of economies.  
Testing for full risk-sharing was one of the first approaches taken by 
scholars while measuring the efficiency of a currency area. A significant 
number of studies such as Cochrane (1991), Canova & Ravn (1996), Lewis 
(1996) and Mace (1991), reject the hypothesis of full risk-sharing. The same 
conclusion is made by Obstfeld (1994) who also reject the hypothesis of full 
risk-sharing among G7 countries. Breaking with the traditional approach of 
testing for full risk-sharing, another popular approach consisting of 
measuring the amount of shock smoothed started to emerge over time. For 
instance, Sachs & Sala-i-Martin (1992) estimate risk-sharing through federal 
government fiscal policy in a pioneering work by taking the amount of 
income insurance provided to the US states by the US federal government 
as a proxy for the income insurance role. von Hagen (1992) also finds that a 
high amount of risk-sharing is provided by the federal government, 
although in a significantly smaller quantity than the one in the previous 
study, but close to the one found by Asdrubali, Sorensen & Yosha (1996). 
They further explain in a seminal paper the dynamic of risk-sharing in 
selected states of the U.S., even introducing a method based on cross-
sectional variance decomposition for quantifying the amount of interstate 
risk-sharing happening across the country. They identify three channels, 
namely capital markets, credit markets and international transfers and 
conclude following this framework that markets are more efficient than the 
Federal government when it comes to income and consumption smoothing. 
Since then, academic debates have been concerned with the specific issue of 
risk-sharing increasing overtime. Some researchers such as Sorensen et al., 
(2007) find an increase of risk-sharing through income-smoothing and 
consumption-smoothing following the introduction of the euro as a 
common currency. For this purpose, they follow the approach formerly 
introduced by Melitz & Zumer (1999), allowing for country-specific and 
time-varying beta coefficients. Likewise, the hypothesis of risk-sharing 
increasing is supported by La Porta et al., (1998), Kim (1995) and Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sorensen & Yosha (1999) as they proceed to back it up with 
empirical evidence that an increase in specialization may be the cause for 
an increase in risk sharing. Nevertheless, conflicting results have been 
found by Moser, Pointner & Scharler (2004) as well as Bai & Zhang (2012). 
Moreover, recent findings by Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini & Sorensen (2014), 
point out the collapse in risk sharing in the European Union following the 
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last debt crisis. Therefore, they further decompose channels of smoothing 
in order to highlight the role of government and private savings. 
On the other hand, one can argue that these implemented 
methodologies are not complete as they exclude major smoothing channels 
previously identified by Mundell (1961) in the OCA theory. Asdrubali, 
Sorensen & Yosha (1996) gave the reason for ignoring interstate labor 
mobility in the United States while identifying the different channels 
through which most of the smoothing will be achieved. Along the lines of 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1991) as well as Blanchard & Katz (1992), they 
considered interstate labor mobility in the US to play a minor role in shock 
smoothing as it involve long lags. They argue that if workers did migrate 
whenever a shock happened, differences in per capita gross state product 
would not hold. In this regard, Gurtner (1999) finds it difficult to evaluate 
the degree of labor mobility within the CFA Franc zone, and concludes that 
neither WAEMU nor CEMAC fit the classical criterion of OCA as defined 
in the literature. Boccara & Devarajan (1993) came to the same conclusion, 
and show that factor mobility is low within the CFA franc zone. 
In contrast to Europe and the U.S., very few academic studies have been 
conducted on international risk sharing across the CFA Franc zone. Yehoue 
(2005) notices the poor performance of standard shock absorbers such as 
transfer payments, labor mobility and capital mobility in the efficient 
smoothing of negative external shocks in the CFA Franc zone. By analyzing 
the pattern of risk sharing through these channels and comparing them to 
studies related to the euro zone, Yehoue (2005) finds that only about 15 
percent of shock to output are smoothed through these standard channels 
in the CEMAC, and only 13 percent in the WAEMU. This result is very low 
when put into perspective with findings displaying that about 44 percent of 
shocks are smoothed in the euro zone. This suggests that mechanisms of 
risk sharing in Europe were already more elaborate even prior to the 
creation of the euro zone in 2000, in comparison with shock absorption 
mechanisms present in the CFA Franc zone, despite the latter having over 
half a century of existence more than the former. He also demonstrates that 
the CEMAC and the WAEMU are more likely to achieve risk sharing 
through financial support from France than through standards channels of 
shock dampening. This assumption does not contradict Boughton (1991), 
who sees France’s role as the reason why member states benefit from their 
participation to currency unions. Studying risk sharing in the ECOWAS, 
Zouri (2019) provides more information on the accounting decomposition 
of national aggregates and therefore concludes that countries within that 
zone must prioritize the expansion of regional credit markets and 
increasing the effectiveness of official development assistance as well as net 
primary income. 
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3. Methodology and estimation techniques 
3.1. Static smoothing channel approach 
As part of our process in assessing the CEMAC’s economic efficiency, 
this paper will mainly focus on measuring the degree of international risk 
sharing across member states. Asdrubali, Sorensen & Yosha (1996) first 
developed a framework based on cross-sectional variance decomposition 
allowing quantification of the amount of risk sharing happening across the 
US states, as well as the repartition through various identified channels, 
namely capital markets, fiscal system channel and credit markets. This 
technique also allows determining whether or not full risk sharing does 
take place in the currency union by gauging the amount of risk 
unsmoothed through those three main channels in a distinct component. 
The underlying intuition for channels of international risk sharing 
identification follows the System of National Accounts’ structure. Here, the 
capital market channel is represented by the Net Factor Income obtained by 
subtracting the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to the Gross National 
Income (GNI), the fiscal channel is reflected by Net International Transfers 
which can be found by subtracting GNI to the Gross Disposable Income 
(GDI), and finally the credit market channel is represented by savings 
which are the result of subtracting GDI to consumption (C). Accordingly, 
Asdrubali, Sorensen & Yosha (1996) design a measure of smoothing by 
establishing the following identity: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 =
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼 𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼 𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝐼 𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝐼 𝑖
𝐶 𝑖
𝐶𝑖                               (1) 
 
Where𝑖 denotes an index for country. Hence, the decomposition of cross-
sectional variance in GDP into identified components can be found first by 
taking logs and first differences, then multiplying both sides of identity 
equation (1) by ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 . Next step consists in taking expectations written 
as follows: 
 
Var  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 
= Cov  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 , ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 −  ∆log𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖  
+ Cov  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 , ∆log𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖 −  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑖  
 +Cov  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 , ∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑖 −  ∆log𝐶𝑖  
 +Cov  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 , ∆logC       (2) 
 
Last, identity equation (3) is obtained by dividing both sides of equation 
(2) by the variance of ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖: 
 
1 = 𝛽𝐾 + 𝛽𝐹 + 𝛽𝐶 + 𝛽𝑈                         (3) 
 
Where β
K
 ,  β
F
and β
C
are interpreted as the amount of smoothing (in 
percentage) of a GDP shock achieved respectively through net factor 
income payments (capital market channel), international transfers (fiscal 
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stabilization channel) and savings (credit market channel); β
U
 denotes the 
quantity of shock that remains unsmoothed. Accordingly, the basic 
empirical method used to estimate the β coefficients thus quantifying the 
amount of risk sharing fulfilled through each known channel consists in a 
series of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regressions. The GLS regression 
of ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 −  ∆log𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖 on  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  in order to obtain 𝛽𝐾 , the regression 
of ∆log𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖 −  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑖 on  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  in order to obtain 𝛽𝐹 , the regression 
of ∆log𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖 −  ∆log𝐶𝑖  on   ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  in order to obtain 𝛽𝐶 and finally the 
regression of ∆log𝐶𝑖  on   ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  in order to obtain 𝛽𝑈 . The set of 
equations for the said GLS panel regressions are stated as follows: 
 
∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 − ∆log𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼𝐾,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑖 + 𝜇𝐾 ,𝑡
𝑖              (4) 
∆log𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑖 − ∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼𝐹,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑖 + 𝜇𝐹,𝑡
𝑖               (5) 
∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑖 − ∆log𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝐶,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑖 + 𝜇𝐶,𝑡
𝑖              (6) 
 ∆log𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝑈,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑖 + 𝜇𝑈,𝑡
𝑖                 (7) 
 
Where α is the time fixed effect coefficient in each equation. It reflects 
the impact of GDP growth rate during each specific year. In the case where 
𝛽𝐾 + 𝛽𝐹 + 𝛽𝐶 = 1, we conclude that there is full risk sharing and 𝛽𝑈 = 0. A 
negative value of  β will be interpreted as a sign that there is great 
smoothing happening through the channel. However, a β> 1 denotes that 
rather than being smoothed, the effects of shocks are boosted instead of 
being reduced by the channel. 
 
3.2. Dynamic panel VAR 
Though using a static smoothing channel approach allow us to fulfill our 
goal in this study, still we ought to consider the evolution in the empirical 
methodology for measuring risk sharing in the literature. Motivated by 
Baxter & Crucini (1995) work on the behavior of consumption smoothing 
channels using dynamic equilibrium open economy model, as well as 
Canova & Ravn (1996) focus on exogenous consumption shifters that they 
identified as shocks, Asdrubali & Kim (2004) introduced a VAR framework 
as a technique to not only for testing the implications of the evolution of 
risk-sharing literature, but also addressing the limits of the static smoothing 
channel approach. Therefore, Asdrubali & Kim (2004) were able to not only 
analyze risk-sharing and consumption smoothing channels, but they were 
also able to measure how long it takes for a shock to be dampened. The 
panel vector auto regression (VAR) they used takes into account the 
dynamic properties of different smoothing channels, making it possible to 
efficiently answer policies issues regarding the degree of complementarity 
and substitutability among channels3. Here, we will use the dynamic panel 
VAR in order to analyze risk-sharing in CEMAC, then we will compare 
those results with previous work on the topic. In so doing, we first consider 
the following reduced form panel VAR: 
 
𝑍𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝜃 𝐿 𝑍𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖        (8) 
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Where 𝛾 is an 𝑛 − 1 constant matrix; 𝑍𝑡
𝑖  is an n − 1  data vector 𝜃 𝐿 =
𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐿 + 𝜃2𝐿
2 + ⋯ =  𝜃𝑗𝐿
𝑗∞
𝑗=0  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator 
L; n is the number of variables in the model; 𝜀𝑡
𝑖  is the residual and var 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 =
𝛴 . Therefore to describe the economy, we recover the structural form 
equation written as follows: 
 
𝐵0𝑍𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜑 + 𝐵 𝐿 𝑍𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡
𝑖                          (9) 
 
Where 𝐴0 is the 𝑛𝑥𝑛 contemporaneous structural parameter matrix with 
1’s in the diagonal; 𝐵 𝐿  is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L;𝜑 is an 
𝑛 − 1constant matrix and 𝜔𝑡
𝑖  is an 𝑛 − 1 structural disturbance vector. The 
error term 𝜔𝑡
𝑖  is serially uncorrelated and var 𝜔𝑡
𝑖  = Ω .  Ω  is a diagonal 
matrix whose diagonal elements are the variances of structural 
disturbances. The following moving average representation of the 
structural form equation: 
 
𝑍𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜑∗ + 𝐵 𝐿 𝜔𝑡
𝑖                                (10) 
 
With the assumption that 𝐵0 − 𝐿𝐵 𝐿 is invertible, 𝜑
∗ = φ. (𝐵0 −
𝐿𝐵 𝐿 )−1, 𝐵 𝐿 ∗ =  𝐵0 − 𝐿𝐵 𝐿  
−1
𝐵(𝐿), and 𝐵 0 ∗ = 𝐵0
−1. We impose short 
run restrictions on the contemporaneous structural parameters 𝐵0 along the 
lines of Sims (1980) so that we are able to recover the parameters in the 
structural form equation4: 
 
 
1
 𝛽21
0
1
0
0
0
0
𝛽31
𝛽41
𝛽32
𝛽42
1
𝛽43
0
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑖
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑖 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑡
𝑖
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑡
𝑖 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝑖
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝑖 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑡
𝑖  
 
 
 
 
=  𝜑 + 𝐵 𝐿 
 
 
 
 
 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑡−1
𝑖 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑡−1
𝑖
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑡−1
𝑖 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑡−1
𝑖  
 
 
 
 
+
 
 
 
 
 
𝜔𝐺𝐷𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑖
𝜔𝐾,𝑡
𝑖
𝜔𝐹,𝑡
𝑖
𝜔𝐶,𝑡
𝑖  
 
 
 
 
 
  (11) 
 
The difference between the analysis using the static system and the 
dynamic panel VAR is that the first examine the smoothing of an exogenous 
variable  ∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 by identified channels when the latter focus on 
examining the smoothing of 𝜔𝐺𝐷𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑖 , the actual exogenous shocks to output. 
However, Athanasoulis & van Wincoop (2001) stressed the importance to 
isolate unpredictable shocks in order to obtain a more accurate measure. 
The way to do that is by setting a restriction to 𝜔𝐺𝐷𝑃 ,𝑡
𝑖  so that it is orthogonal 
to the information about the history of all the variables in the system5. As 
for the short-run identifying assumptions, we keep the same ordering6 than 
Asdrubali & Kim (2004). First, capital markets smoothing channel depends 
only on lagged values of the other variables. Then, international transfers 
channel depends on contemporaneous capital markets but not the credit 
market channel. Finally, the credit market channel depends on both 
contemporaneous inflation and international transfers7.  
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4. Data sources and empirical results 
4.1. Data description and estimation strategy 
The dataset analyzed for international risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing within CEMAC is a heterogeneous dynamic panel data, made of 
National Accounts data for six countries, covering the timespan 1986-20188 
sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database 
(WDI). The variables used in this analysis are in real per capita terms (in 
2010 U.S. dollars) defined as follows: GDP (Gross Domestic Product), GNP 
(Gross National Product), GDI (Gross Disposable Income) and Total 
Consumption (C). By using panel data we are able reduce the noise coming 
from the individual time series and therefore avoid the issue of 
heteroscedasticity. Moreover, panel data analysis is best suited for 
developing countries where data availability is an issue, often insufficient 
for fitting time series regressions. Also, panel estimation techniques takes 
into account dynamic changes due to repeated cross-sectional observations 
by including lagged dependent variable as a regressor. Particularly in this 
study we included two lags9 as well as a constant term.  All the variables 
are I(1), since the null hypothesis that the data series exhibits a unit root 
cannot be rejected, and thus specified in logged differences. Similarly, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated10.  
In the lines of Kose et al. (2009) we analyze the evolution of international 
risk sharing overtime by estimating the models for the whole sample, as 
well as three subsamples namely 1986-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2018. This 
partition11 allows us to check the effect of the CFA Franc’s depreciation 
against the French currency following the devaluation in 1994 and the 
introduction of the euro in 2000.  
 
4.2. International risk sharing in the CEMAC 
4.2.1. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.2.1.1. Evolution of Risk Sharing Overtime 
Table 1 displays the estimates β-coefficients for the amount of smoothed 
output shocks at impact (impact GDP change = 100), using both the static 
smoothing channel approach (SSCA) and the dynamic panel VAR 
(DPVAR) from 1986 to 2018 within CEMAC. Estimation is made for the 
whole sample 1986-2018 as well as for three subsamples 1986-1993, 1994-
1999 and 2000-2018. The capital market channel is represented by 
∆log𝐺𝐷𝑃 − ∆log𝐺𝑁𝑃 and referred to as ‚CAP‛ in the present study. The 
same goes for the fiscal channel (‚FIS‛) and credit market channel (‚CRE‛) 
respectively represented by ∆log𝐺𝑁𝑃 − ∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼 and ∆log𝐺𝐷𝐼 − ∆log𝐶 . The 
amount of unsmoothed shocks (‚UNS‛) is reported in the last row and 
satisfies equation (3). The 𝛽𝐾 coefficients reported for the smoothing 
channel CAP reveals that international risk sharing through capital markets 
rose after 1994, but especially after the CFA franc devaluation in 1994 and 
drastically goes down after the introduction of the euro in 2000. On the 
contrary, the 𝛽𝐹  coefficients reported for the smoothing channel ‚FIS‛ show 
that international risk sharing through international transfers appears to be 
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very minimal. There is a slight improvement after the CFA franc 
devaluation in 1994, but after euro has been introduced in 2000, risk-
sharing did not happen through FIS, even there is di-smoothing. Regarding 
the 𝛽𝐶  coefficients reported for the smoothing channel CRE show that 
credit markets channel is the strongest out of all the identified smoothing 
channels, except for the second subsample 1994-1999. 
Roughly 72.09 percent of shocks to output stay unsmoothed from 1986 
to 2018, using dynamic panel VAR. Besides, we notice that not taking into 
account dynamics as well as the endogeneity of output, results in the 
underestimation of the fraction of unsmoothed shocks. There is a 5 point-
difference when considering the whole sample (1986-2018) which is 
relatively low compared to the 35 point-difference displayed in the second 
subsample (1994-1999), which goes up to 56 point- difference when 
considering the last subsample (2000-2018). The first subsample (1986-1993) 
displays the lowest difference (4 points) between the results using the static 
smoothing channel approach and the dynamic panel VAR.  
 
Table 1. International Risk Sharing Estimates through Various Smoothing Channels 
Channel 
1986-2018 1986-1993 1994-1999 2000-2018 
SSCA DPVAR SSCA DPVAR SSCA DPVAR SSCA DPVAR 
CAP 
0.1461 0.1148 0.1406 -0.1197 0.165 -0.3707 0.0477 -0.3057 
(0.0979) (0.1032) (0.2101) (0.2587) (0.2339) (0.0579) (0.1728) (0.1739) 
FIS 
0.0291 -0.0316 0.079 -0.0918 -0.0495 0.0538 0.0525 -0.1094 
(0.0674) (0.0658) (0.1030) (0.0854) (0.1817) (0.1722) (0.1501) (0.1652) 
CRE 
0.1522 0.1959 0.1277 0.4488 -0.0709 0.0868 0.4585 0.3955 
(0.1482) (0.0906) (0.2517) (0.2161) (0.1962) (0.0247) (0.3136) (0.1801) 
UNS 0.6761 0.7209 0.7236 0.7627 0.8845 1.2301 0.455 1.0196 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: a. Static Smoothing Channel Approach (SSCA) refers the estimation of the system of 
equations (4) using Generalized Least Squares and fixed effects modeling and auto-
correlated AR (1) errors; Dynamic Panel VAR (DPVAR) refers to the estimation of equation 
(8), impact responses to GDP shock (impact GDP change =100). b. ‚CAP‛, ‚FIS‛, ‚CRE‛ and 
‚UNS‛ denotes respectively amounts smoothed through the capital market channel, fiscal 
channel, credit market channel and the amount of unsmoothed shocks. c. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses 
 
On the other hand, the evolution of international risk-sharing overtime 
is uneven with a peak during the second subsample period 1994-1999 
attesting that the CFA franc devaluation of 1994 had a negative impact, 
using both methods. The introduction of the euro in 2000 appears to have a 
positive impact on international risk-sharing for CEMAC countries when 
using the static regression as the amount of shock smoothed during this 
period is greater. However, we observe that results using dynamic panel 
VAR show there is no international risk-sharing happening after the CFA 
franc depreciation against its reference currency, after 1994 and again after 
2000. 
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Graph 1. Impulse ResponsesFunctions of Output and Smoothing Channels within 
CEMAC, 1986-2018 
Notes: a. Graph 1 reports impulse responses with two standard errors bands (at 95% 
probability) over 10 years in the system with SR restrictions. The scale of all the graphs in 
each column is the same. b. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
To further breakdown the behavior of the smoothing channels following 
an exogenous output shock, we observe the impulse response functions 
(IRFs). Shock to output (in the first column in graph 1) causes GDP to rise 
sharply on impact (impact GDP change = 100), displaying a positive 
response (10.82 percent of total GDP increase a year). There is a plateau on 
the third year, then followed by a steady decline during the fourth year and 
finally converging to zero on the tenth period following the shock. 
Regarding the dynamics of the smoothing channels’ impulse responses to 
the exogenous shock (see table 2), we note that capital market (CAP) 
smoothing is mostly positive until the third year following the shock when 
we even note a dis-smoothing, before converging to zero the fourth year. 
Shock smoothing through fiscal channel (FIS) displays a different, as there 
is dis-smoothing happening at impact and persisting until a year after the 
shock. The essential of smoothing through net transfers happen only the 
second year following the shock, again followed by dis-smoothing during 
the third period and finally converging to zero after the fourth year 
following the exogenous shock.  
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Table 2. Impulse Responses to Output Shock, CEMAC, 1986- 2018 
Year GDP CAP FIS CRE 
0 1.0000 0.1148 -0.0316 0.1959 
 
(0.005) (0.103) (0.065) (0.090) 
1 0.1082 0.0124 -0.0038 0.0194 
 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) 
2 0.0331 0.0074 0.0138 -0.0052 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) 
3 0.0287 -0.0038 -0.0055 0.0102 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) 
4 0.0143 -0.0004 0.0025 0.0006 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: a. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. b. ‚CAP‛, ‚FIS‛, ‚CRE‛ denote 
respectively the amount of shocks smoothed by capital markets, fiscal transfers and credit 
markets channels, ‚Cum‛ denotes cumulative responses to GDP shock. 
 
As for GDP shock smoothing through savings (CRE), we note that the 
impulse response function visibly goes to the opposite direction compared 
to the previous fiscal channel. In fact, we observe a positive response until a 
year after the exogenous shock happened. However, during the second 
year, there is dis-smoothing happening through savings, following an 
increase during the third year and finally converging to zero during year 
four. 
4.2.1.2. Substitutability of smoothing channels 
The IRFs of shock to each smoothing channel (from the second to the 
fourth column in graph 1) are useful to check if the channels act as 
substitutes or complements. A positive shock to capital market channel, 
fiscal channel and credit market channel leave GDP almost unchanged at 
impact. After the first year however, we spot very small though persisting 
dis-smoothing through capital market channel, rather significant dis-
smoothing through fiscal channel as well as slight smoothing happening 
through credit market channel both converging to zero by the fourth year 
following the shock. As stated by Asdrubali & Kim (2004), if a change in a 
smoothing channel is destabilizing output, the said channel may be 
reconsidered in its utility in the smoothing process. In the case of CEMAC, 
capital market channel and fiscal channel may be at fault. This can be 
explained by the fact that capital markets in the region are not well 
integrated, and despite the decision made by authorities to create a regional 
stock exchange to serve the CEMAC, the lack of local big companies to 
enlist makes its implementation quite laborious. In the case of fiscal 
channel, considering it as a possible hindrance to output shock smoothing 
process ties in with Chambas (1994) conclusion that francophone Africa 
fiscal instruments are too unwieldy to be considered as reliable 
stabilization tools. 
The response of capital market channel to a positive shock to fiscal 
channel and credit market channel is quite similar as the variable remains 
unchanged at impact, yet shows a negative reaction after two years. The 
same goes for fiscal channel which displays a similar response to a positive 
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shock to capital market channel and credit market channel. However, if the 
variable remains unchanged at impact, a slightly positive reaction takes 
place in both cases on the following years, finally converging to zero after 
four years. Most importantly, we find that an increase in net factor income 
and international transfers significantly decreases saving, ceteris paribus. 
More precisely, an increase in net factor income (14.95 percent) reduces 
saving almost by half (-7.80 percent). This shows that there is partial 
substitutability linking capital market channel to credit market channel. 
Though, the relationship between fiscal channel and credit market channel 
appears to be deeper than the previous one as an increase in the fiscal 
channel (9.51 percent) totally supplants credit market channel (-13.09 
percent), we can therefore note the total substitutability linking fiscal 
market channel to credit market channel. 
4.2.2. Comparison with existing literature and discussion 
For comparison purposes, we take estimates from Yehoue (2005) 
analysis of international risk sharing within CEMAC from 1980 to 2000. The 
sample period obviously differs from ours, as it includes a time period 
when Equatorial Guinea was not a part of the currency union yet (before 
1986) and stops at the introduction of the euro (2000) against which the 
CFA was greatly depreciated compared to the new French currency.  
When comparing Yehoue’s (2005) empirical results to our estimates 
using the static regression, we observe from table 3 below that there less 
than a unit difference between β- coefficients for capital market channel 
and fiscal channel. However, we also find almost twice the amount of 
output shock is smoothed through credit market channel, compared to 
Yehoue’s (2005) estimation. Again, the explanation of these differences may 
be the difference of the sample period. The gap grows deeper when we 
consider the results obtained using dynamic panel VAR, not only for credit 
market, but capital market and fiscal channels as well. But surprisingly, our 
dynamic panel VAR estimate for unsmoothed shocks is closer from 
Yehoue’s (2005) findings than the static regression estimate. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Smoothing Channels Estimates for CEMAC (% of total shock to output) 
  YH𝑎  SSCA𝑏  DPVAR𝑐  
CAP 14.00 14.61 11.48 
 
(0.95) (0.09) (0.10) 
FIS 2.00 2.91 -3.16 
 
(0.56) (0.06) (0.06) 
CRE 8.00 15.22 19.59 
 
(0.54) (0.14) (0.09) 
UNS 85 67.61 72.09 
    Source: Author’s elaboration following the description in the notes 
Notes: a. Yehoue (2005) analyzes international risk sharing for CEMAC from 1980 to 2000.T-
statistics are in parentheses. b. Static smoothing channel approach for CEMAC from 1986 to 
2018. Standard errors are in parentheses. c. Dynamic panel VAR for CEMAC from 1986 to 
2018, impact responses to GDP shock (impact GDP change = 100). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Likewise, in order to evaluate CEMAC performance when it comes to 
smoothing shocks, we compare our findings to similar empirical studies 
applied to other unions, namely the United States and Europe12. Using the 
static smoothing channel for Europe, Sorensen & Yosha (1998) found 65.5 
percent quantity of non-smoothed shocks to output, slightly lower than our 
estimate using the same technique. However, Melitz & Zumer (1999) 
estimation of 80 percent of unsmoothed output shocks appear to be more in 
line with Yehoue (2005) findings. Asdrubali & Kim (2004) find even less 
amount of unsmoothed shocks (49.9 percent) across Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. However, 
when considering cumulative responses, the quantity of unsmoothed 
shocks (78.8 percent) is higher. Thus, we can conclude that static regression 
approach fails to appropriately detect the lagged dis-smoothing effect. On 
the other hand, the use of dynamic panel VAR shows that international risk 
sharing is larger in Europe than it is in the CEMAC. Also, we note that 
credit market channel appears to have the strongest capacity to smooth 
shocks to GDP than fiscal and capital markets channels within Europe. This 
result can be justified by the fact that credit markets are much more 
elaborated and regionally integrated in developed countries than they are 
in developing countries. Nevertheless, regarding net factor income channel 
not being more effective at absorbing shocks in Europe than in CEMAC, is 
surprising when one would have expected that the presence of operational 
European financial markets to make a clear difference. 
This is not the case for the US as results found by Asdrubali, Sorensen & 
Yosha (1996), Melitz & Zumer (1999) and Asdrubali & Kim (2004) point 
capital market channel as the strongest shock absorber out of the three 
standard smoothing channels. Net transfers from federal government 
although minor compared to other channels, also play a non-negligible role 
in the smoothing of structural shocks. Overall, the estimates for the 
quantity of unsmoothed shocks are lower in the case of the US than our 
estimates for CEMAC. In fact, out of all the studies Melitz & Zumer (1999) 
find the highest amount of non-smoothed shocks (39 percent) within the 
US13, therefore concluding that interstate risk sharing within the US14 is 
definitely larger than international risk sharing across European countries. 
Our findings do not contradict this observation as interstate risk sharing in 
the US is also larger than international risk sharing measured in the 
CEMAC. 
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Graph 2. Dynamic Risk Sharing Through Different Smoothing Channels 
(% of total shock to output) 
Notes: a. Estimates reported for CEMAC are obtained using dynamic panel VAR (Impact 
GDP change=100). b. Estimates reported for OECD and the US are sourced from Asdrubali 
and Kim (2004), and obtained using dynamic panel VAR. (Impact GDP c hange = 100 and 
Impact GSP change = 100, respectively) 
 
Graph 2 compares dynamic risk-sharing obtained in the CEMAC, the 
OECD and in the US. First, the direct impact of output shocks on 
consumption is more than four times bigger in the CEMAC than it is in the 
US and almost a time and a half than it is in Europe. One percent decline in 
GDP leads to a decline of about 0.72 percent in consumption in the 
CEMAC, against 0.49 percent in Europe and only 0.16 percent in the US. 
Secondly, although cross-border risk –sharing through fiscal transfers is not 
particularly strong in the US, it is almost non-existent in Europe and has an 
adverse effect in the CEMAC. Country-specific shocks can therefore lead to 
sub-optimal level of stabilization for the Central African Monetary union 
through fiscal channel. Also, cross-border borrowing appears to be more 
prominent across OECD countries (47.6 percent) than anywhere else, while 
the CEMAC displays the lowest amount of risk-sharing through credit 
markets channel (19.59 percent). This is certainly the result of better 
integrated credit markets in developed countries. Finally, shock absorption 
through capital markets channel reveal a striking difference between the 
US (46.4 percent) and the CEMAC (11.48 percent), and even more 
surprisingly between the CEMAC and OEDC countries (2 percent). While 
the capital markets channel is more than four times stronger in the US than 
in Central African countries as one could have expected, due to the 
presence of functioning financial markets, shock smoothing through this 
channel is even less efficient in Europe. As European countries are far more 
financially integrated than CEMAC member countries, one might speculate 
that the cause for this result relies elsewhere. 
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One possible explanation of the lack of international risk-sharing given 
by Asdrubali & Kim (2004) might be the presence of the consumption-
output correlation puzzle 15  at the occurrence of output shocks. In this 
paper, we track consumption movements by observing fluctuations in 
savings as they are essentially attributable to changes in country-specific 
consumption (∆log𝐶𝑖). As we can see in graph 1, output shocks generate a 
higher cross-country consumption correlation than cross-country output 
correlation, hence generating the consumption-output correlation puzzle. 
As demonstrated by Baxter & Crucini16 (1995), such puzzle happen due to 
market incompleteness, along the lines of our previous mention that 
member countries of CEMAC are not well financially integrated. 
 
5. Policy implications 
In this section, we comment the policies currently implemented with 
regards to our findings on international risk sharing within the CEMAC. 
Member states are under the IMF’s structural adjustment program, 
meaning that the implementation fiscal consolidation and currency 
devaluation by member states is strongly recommended in order to reduce 
government deficits as well as debt accumulation. Fiscal consolidation 
often follows exchange rate crisis as a part of the measures taken to restore 
confidence. Indeed, one can expect improvement in the public deficit, 
simultaneously with improvement in the current account balance following 
fiscal spending cuts as the Mundell-Fleming approach implies17. Though, 
we observe that fiscal channel had little to no contribution on output shock 
smoothing in this particular case, even boosting shock instead of smoothing 
it. As a matter of fact, consolidation prevents transfer payments, yet 
identified by Mundell (1973) as a stabilizer which helps facilitating 
adjustment after an adverse macroeconomic shock. This is a possible 
explanation to why the fiscal channel has no contribution to risk-sharing. 
Moreover, in a context of unemployment and rigid prices/wages as it is the 
case in Central African countries, the decision to cut government 
expenditures causes demand shocks to have short-run output costs. 
Accordingly, the traditional Keynesian models anticipate a shift of the 
aggregate demand curve downwards and thereby contractionary real 
effects in terms of both consumption and output18 in the context of rigid 
prices. Further explaining why not only the fiscal channel has no impact on 
output shock smoothing, but also government expenditure cuts amplify the 
negative short-run effects instead of offsetting them, thus boosting the 
shock. We can therefore come to the conclusion that fiscal consolidation 
prevent risk-sharing in the CEMAC through fiscal channel. 
By raising the policy rate by 55 basis points to 3.5 percent19, monetary 
authorities aim to stimulate the aggregate demand. However, the presence 
of excess liquidity in the banking system weakens the monetary 
transmission mechanism, thus the ability of monetary authorities to 
stimulate aggregate demand, as demonstrated by Saxegaard (2006) in his 
study of CEMAC countries. This obviously does not help to contribute to 
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the risk-sharing ability of member states. Besides, due to the ongoing 
currency crisis, capital controls prevent capital movements, also identified 
by Mundell (1973) and Eichengreen (2003) as an alternative stabilization 
tool and a means of recovery for depressed countries. While the reduction 
of capital movement achieves to remove another key stabilization tool, 
Greenwood & Kimbrough (1985) explain the tendency for disturbances to 
have a more pronounced effect under capital controls, as there is less 
spillover to world markets. This causes risk-sharing within CEMAC to 
underperform under such policies.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In order to assess the optimality of CEMAC in the light of the second 
OCA model proposed by Mundell (1973), we measure in this paper the 
amount of risk-sharing happening across member states. Relying on the 
innovative technique of dynamic panel VAR introduced by Asdrubali & 
Kim (2004), we were able to break down international risk-sharing 
mechanism within CEMAC, taking into account dynamics between the 
identified smoothing channels.Therefore, we were able to compare the 
results obtained by using static smoothing channel approach to those 
obtained by using dynamic panel VAR. 
First, the conclusion that emerges from this observation does not 
contradict Asdrubali & Kim (2004) statement that static estimation greatly 
undermines what they refer to as the lagged dis-smoothing effect as we 
observe significantly higher amount of unsmoothed output shocks using 
the dynamic panel VAR (72.09 percent) compared with static regression 
estimate (67.26 percent) for the CEMAC, from 1986 to 2018. Also, the 
observation of shocks to smoothing channels allows us to observe the 
dynamics between them and conclude that there is substitutability as a 
positive shock to capital market channel will oust credit market channel 
almost by half, while a positive shock to fiscal channel will completely 
offset credit market channel in CEMAC. Moreover, the detection of a 
consumption-output correlation puzzle while observing impulse responses 
functions for shocks to smoothing channels, further prove the emergency of 
better integrated capital markets. Previous studies on the CEMAC solely 
based on static regression were not able to spot these dynamics between 
smoothing channels, information that can be of use during the decision-
making process. 
Second, by parting our sample into three subsamples, we detect the 
negative effect of the CFA franc devaluation in 1994 on international risk 
sharing within the CEMAC. However, we note on the other hand that the 
introduction of the euro in replacement to the French franc in 2000 had a 
positive impact on international risk-sharing. When using SSCA, the 
amount of shock smoothed is the largest. But if we refer to DPVAR, even if 
there is a great improvement in smoothing through the credit channel, the 
di-smoothing through capital markets and transfer payments annihilates 
that. 
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Then, our analysis of fiscal and monetary policies currently 
implemented by the BEAC show that not only the adverse effects of fiscal 
consolidation on short-run aggregate demand will be amplified in a context 
of high unemployment and excess liquidity, hence undermining its 
benefits, but also capital controls, by restraining capital movements hinder 
the efficiency of the region as a currency area. We believe that in future 
work, it would be interesting to identify whether or not the degree of shock 
asymmetry plays a role in limiting international risk-sharing within the 
CEMAC. 
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Notes 
 
1 The cooperation agreements were signed in order for France to guarantee the convertibility 
of the CFA franc to the French currency.  
2 At the creation of the CFA franc in 1945, the rate was fixed at 1 CFA franc = 1.70 FF. It was 
revalued in 1948 to 1CFA franc = 2.00 FF. In 1960, the French franc was revalued, fixing the 
new rate at 1FF = 50 CFA franc. Then, the CFA franc was further devalued in 1994 to 1FF = 
100 CFA franc. Finally in 2000, the replacement of the French franc by the euro fixed the 
current rate to 1 euro = 655 CFA franc. 
3  Asdrubali & Kim (2004) were able to examine whether each smoothing channel is a 
substitute or a complement for the others by tracing the impulse responses of all variables 
to shocks to smoothing channels. 
4 We can notice here that by setting the coefficients 𝑏32 , 𝑏42 ,𝑏43  and 𝐵 𝐿  all equal to zero, we 
obtain the static model stated in the system of equations (4) which considers neither 
contemporaneous nor lagged interactions. 
5  In the same way, ωK,t
i  , ωF,t
i  and ωC,t
i are interpreted respectively as shocks to capital 
markets, shocks to international transfers and shocks to credit markets.   
6 Choleski identification     
7  The ordering, as stated by Asdrubali & Kim (2004), is motivated by the idea that 
consumers would decide how much to save based on the risk-sharing achieved by other 
channels and income taxes are based on capital income. 
8 The start date 1986 represents the year when the sixth member Equatorial Guinea joined 
the CEMAC.  
9 Wooldridge (2001) mentions that the number of lags is typically small (1 or 2 lags), in order 
not to lose degrees of freedom. In this study we chose to use 2 lags with a constant like 
Asdrubali & Kim (2004). 
10 According to the Pedronicointegration test used to analyze panel data. The absence of 
cointegration denotes there is no long-run relationship between the variables, thus our 
decision to estimate only the dynamic panel VAR system with short-run restrictions.   
11 Regarding the dynamic panel VAR analysis, we would like to pinpoint that the use of this 
methodology exempt us from choosing between fixed effect or random effect model 
necessary in the Generalized Least Squares used in the static smoothing channel approach, 
even when we split our sample in several subgroups. 
12 All the estimates are sourced from Asdrubali & Kim (2004) and reported in appendix B.  
13  Asdrubali, Sorensen & Yosha (1996) find 25 percent of unsmoothed shocks, when 
Asdrubali & Kim (2004) find 16.3 percent (impact GSP change =100). Results are reported 
in Appendix B. 
14  The reason being that the US were supposedly hit by less severe idiosyncratic 
disturbances than OECD countries as stated by Melitz & Zumer (1999)Clark & Shin (2000). 
15 In a seminal paper, Backus, Kehoue & Kydland (1992) state that cross-country output 
correlations are higher than cross-country consumption correlations. When the opposite is 
observed, there is a puzzle. 
16  Using dynamic general equilibrium open economy model, Baxter & Crucini (1995) 
showed that cross-country output correlation is higher than cross-country consumption 
correlation in the bonds-only economy model, in the presence of permanent productivity 
shocks. 
17 The Mundell- Fleming approach implies that fiscal spending cuts will decrease aggregate 
demand and result in a real depreciation of the exchange rate together with an 
improvement in the current account. 
18 In the traditional Keynesian models, consumption is determined by current income. 
19 Real interest rate movements are known to be negatively correlated under capital controls. 
As explained by Greenwood & Kimbrough (1985), quantitative restrictions on 
international capital flows sever any direct link between domestic and foreign real interest 
rates. This may explain why in a global context of declining rates the BEAC follows an 
opposite direction.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The Dataset 
 
Table A.1. Definition of variable𝑠𝑎  
Variable Definition Source 
GDP Gross Domestic Product World Development Indicators 
GNP Gross National Product World Development Indicators 
GDI Gross Disposable Income GNP +ToT𝑏  
C Total Consumption GDI - GNS𝑐  
          
Source: Author’s elaboration following the description in the notes 
Notes: All the variables are calculated in real per capita terms (in 2010 U.S. dollars). a. ToT = Terms of 
Trade, sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators. b. GNS = Gross National Savings, 
sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
Appendix 2: Comparison of smoothing channels estimates 
 
Table B.1. Comparison of smoothing channels estimates, OECD (% of total shock to output) 
  SY𝑎  MZ𝑏  AK (impact)𝑐  AK (cum. )𝑑  
GDP 100 100 100 100 
 
- - (2.9) (7.2) 
CAP -1 5 2 -0.5 
 
(1.0) (0.5) (0.9) (2.2) 
FIS 1.5 - 0.5 -0.5 
 
(1.0) - (0.6) (1.0) 
     
CRE 34.5 13 47.6 22.3 
 
(4.0) (0.7) (2.7) (4.2) 
UNS 65.5 80 49.9 78.7 
  (3.5) -  (2.6) (6.7) 
Source: Asdrubali & Kim (2004) 
Notes: a. Sorensen & Yosha (1998). Sample only includes 13 countries. Averages over two subsamples. b. 
Melitz & Zumer (1999). Pooled multiple regression estimates subject to UNS = 80% c. Asdrubali & Kim 
(2004). Impact responses to structural shock (Impact GDP=100). d. Asdrubali & Kim (2004).Cumulative 
responses to structural shock (cum. GDP change =100) 
 
Table B.2. Comparison of smoothing channels estimates, US (% of total shock to output) 
  ASY𝑎  MZ𝑏  AK impact𝑐  AK cum.𝑑  
GDP 100 100 100 100 
 
- - (2.0) (5.1) 
CAP 39 24 46.4 35.8 
 
(3.0) (3.2) (1.7) (5.1) 
FIS 13 13 9.6 15 
 
(1.0) (1.7) (1.1) (1.5) 
CRE 23 24 27.7 13.5 
 
(6.0) (3.5) (3.4) (4.6) 
UNS 25 39 16.3 35.8 
  (6.0) -  (3.2) (5.1) 
Source: Asdrubali & Kim (2004). 
Notes: a. Asdrubali, Sorensen & Yosha (1996). b. Melitz & Zumer (1999). Pooled multiple regression 
estimates subject to UNS = 39% c. Asdrubali & Kim (2004). Impact responses to GSP shock (Impact GSP 
change =100) d. Asdrubali & Kim (2004).Cumulative responses to GSP shock (cumulative GSP change 
=100). 
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